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OLSON tI. BIOLA CooP. RAISIN GaoWER.CI ASSN.

[So F. No. 17401.

In Bank.

[33 C.2d

Mar. 23,IM9.]

A. J.OLSON ct at, Respondents, v. BIOLA COOPERATIVE RAISIN GROWERS ASSOCIATION (a Corporation) et aI., Appellants.
[1] Markets-Marketing Contracts-Liquidated Damages. -AJn'.
Code, § 1209, authorizin~ a coopcrntivc mllrkl'ting association
to fix by contrl1ct or by-laws the liquidated damagcs to be paid
on a breach of contract, limits that power to thc 5.'\le, dolivery
or withholdin~ of products that may bc the ;,;ubject of thll contract, so that any undertaking by the associntion to go beyond
those stated limits must fall within the provisions of Civ. Code,
II 1670, 1671, which permit the recovery of liquidated damp-ges
only where it would be impractical or extrl'm(:ly difficult to fix
the actual damav:es.
[2] Id.-Marketing Contracts-Liquida.tell Damages. - Independently of statute, a cooperative murketin~ association mny contract for th,. pllymnnt by Ii mcmht·r of Il stipulntcd sum for t!le
violl\tion of his ar.-rt'eml·nt tl' deliver aZl of his product to the
association for prncesRinl!' and marbti~.
[3] Id.-Marketing Contra.cts-Liquidated Damages.-Where the
members of a cOOlmrative raisin growers' association delivered
all of their rai."in~ to the association's pnckin~ house, and the
raisins were acccpt(.'Ci by the packcr, there w:\s 11 completpd
sale, and no liquidated damages could be rcoove!"cd under Agr.
Code, § 1209, because some of the raisins contained excess
moisture.
[4] Id.-Marketing Contracts-Liquidated Damages.-Th,. ICl--islative policy in enacting Agr. Code, I 120:1, with regard to
liquidated damages to protect tho int(·).-ri.ty of a cooperative
marketiDg· 8.ssOOiation;-iiiqiU:K.'Ci on the· tjUllnmy, not the qualify,
feature of the memben' delivery of the promised products to
the association.
[5] Id.~:Marketing· Contracts - Liquidated Damages. - In A~.
Code, I 1209, relating to liquidated damngfls for the breach of
"any provision of the marketing contract regarlling' the snle or
delivery or withholding of products," the word "delivery" em[1] See 8 CaLJur. 844; 16 Cal.Jur. 899; 15 Am.Jur. 671; 35
Am.3ur. 169.
[2] Cooperative marketi~ of farm products by producen' associations, notes, 2.1) A.L.R. 1113; 33 A.L.R. 247; 47 A.L.R. 936;
77 A.L.R. 405; 9R A.L.R. 1406. See, also, 16 Cal.3ur. t!94; 35
Am.3ur. 153.
IIIcX. Dil. Reference: [1-6) Markets, § 12(5).
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braces an agency relationship in contrast to a "sale," Ilnd dol's
not connote "time, place, manner, object, quantity and quality,"
so as to embrace a contract of a grower to deliver his raisins
"properly cured and in good condition."
[6] Id.-Marketing Contracts-Liquidated Damages.-The members of a cooperative raisin growers' association who sold
raisins whieh contained excess moisture were not liable under
a marketing a",o-reement for liquidated damages where the
entire agreement, construed in the light of the circumstanc('s
under which it was made, manifested an intent to provide for
the recovery of liquidated damages only when a member failed
or refused to deliver all his raisins to the association. (Civ.
Code, §§ 1636, 1641.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno
County. Ernest Klette, Judge. Reversed.
Action to recover liquidated damages for delivery of substandard raisins under a marketing agreement. Judgment for
plaintiffs reversed.
Chester R. Andrews, William C. Crossland, Lawrence W.
Young and Milo Popovich for Appellants.
Irvine P. Atten, Aynesworth & Hayhurst, G. I. Aynesworth
and L. Nelson Hayhurst for Respondents.
SPENCE, J .-Following the granting of a rehearin~,
further consideration of the issues presented on this appeal
leads to the conclusion that our former opinion correctly
disposed of such issues, and said opinion is therefore adopted
I
as follows:
Biola Cooperative Raisin Growers Association was organized
as a nonprofit cooperative marketing association under the
laws of the state of California. Plaintiffs-four members of
the association-brought this action, a representative suit,
against thc association and the other sixteen members thereof,
including the five directors, to re('over liquidated dama~('s
alleged to be due by virtue of the delivery of raisins deemed to
be substandard under the provisions of the marketing agreement between the association and its various members. Eight
of the individually named uefendunts were found to be so
liable in conformity with the theory of plaintiffs' complaint,
and judgment accordingly was entered against them in varying
amounts computed upon the basis of their substandard tonnage
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delivery to the association, the total sum being $19,856.79,
plus interest, and costs. These defendants have appealed from
such judgment, urging, as a principal ground for reversal,
that liquidated damages were not properly assessable against
them under the record in this case. Consideration of the
language of the marketing agreement and the statutory regulations governing the disposition of such damage claim as is
hrre made demonstrates the merit of defendants' argument
distinguishing their default as one in quality rather than in
quantity of crop delivery.
The record reveals that on October 20, 1944, plaintiff Chris
H. Scheidt, "a grower member of the . . . Association,"
entered into an agreement with tlle association whereby he
undertook to process and pack the "raisin crop" of the
association "for the year 1944" for a specified sum per ton.
He rented the association's packing house for the season, and
the association '8 members were obligated to deliver their
raisins there "properly cured and in good condition" under
the terms of their marketing agreement with the association.
Delivery of the raisins to Scheidt at the packing house commenced soon after the date of the packing agreement and was
concluded early in 1945. Although the association was empowered under the marketing agreement to set up quality
standards regarding "sugar and moisture content" to "be
met by all raisins delivered by the Grower [s]," it had not
done so. However, it appears that 55 per cent of the raisin
crop in question was under contract for sale to the United
Statel! Government, and the federal regulations, introduced
in evidence, permitted a moisture content of "not more than
18 per cent." Gauged by this standard, there was substantial
evidence that some of the raisins delivered by the eight grower
merubcrs of thc nssociation against whom judgment was
rendered had a higher moisture content so that they could
1I0t be rnn through the stemmer and processed without further
drying. Finding that such raisins "were not properly dried
A nd cured but were too wet and contained too much moisture
,md were too heavy for processing and marketing," the trial
('ourt determined the exact weight of the defective delivery
made by each of the eight defaulting growers and accordingly
proportioned against them plaintiffs' recovery of liquidated
damages.
All of the members' raisins, both wet and dry, were delivered at the packing house, which was under the control of
plaintiff Chris H. Scheidt. He received them, knowing at th,·
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;;:~e of delhet·y or shortly t,ht'ft'after thut !;Olll,t' \)f I hem wrr o
wet. He did report that fact to the officers of the association
but the wet raisins were neither rejected nor returned, and
both he and the association continued to permit the delivery
and acceptance of wet raisins, all of which were ultimately
sold. Some of the growers who had delivered wet raisins
offered to remove them from the packing house and properly
cure them at their own expense, but they were not permitted
to do so. However, it appears that under the government
regulations, all of the raisins--both wet and dry-were sold
for $180 per ton and each grower received an additional $10
per ton as an "incentive payment" or reward for drying his
grapes instead of selling them fresh, so that no one suffered any
loss by reason of the delivery of wet raisins.
With these basic factual considerations at hand, the determinative issue is whether plafntiffs, as representative members of the association, may enforce the collection of liquidated
damages for the default in question, premised solely upon
the allpgation that after demand, the directors failed to act
because three of them, a majority of the board. were interested
parties, having themselves delivered wet raisins to the packing
house. The answer to this problem lies in an analysis of certain provisions of the association's marketing agreement
with its members, in the light of applicable language in the
Agricultural Code bearing upon the exception of cooperative
marketing associations from the rules governing the enforcement of liquidated damage claims under the general law of
this state as expressed in sections 1670 and 1671 of the
Civil Code.
Section 1 of the marketing agreement reads: "The Association buys and the Grower sells to the Association annually
from the date of the signing of the By-Laws of the Association and this agreement all of the raisins owned and grown
by the Grower, and agrees to deliver the same and all thereof
properly cured and in good condition to the plant of the
Association." (Emphasis added.)
Section 7 of the agreement contains the following stipUlation: ,« In the event that Grower should fail to deliver raisins
hereby sold in accordance with terms of this agreement and
these By-Laws, such act will injure the Association to an
amonnt that is, and will be impracticable and extremely difficult to determine and fix, and that is, therefore, fixed at the
amonnt of Twenty-five (25%) per cent of the average current
.~easonal price for each and every ton 0/ ,.aisim 11uJI fhe
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Grower lails 10 a,liver in accordance with the terms hereof
andthe.se By-Laws, and which amount the Growf'.r agrees
to pay, and shall pay, to the Association upon demand . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
And section 13 of the agreement states in part: "It is
expressly understood and agreed that Grower has by this
agreement agreed to and wiLl deliver Ihe raisim herein contracted to be delitJered to the Association, or in lieu thereof
to pay liquidated damage. therefor as by this agreement provided for his failure so to do. . . ." (Emphasis added,)
Section 1209 of the Agricultural Code provides: •• The
by-laws or the' marketing contract may fix, as liquidated damages, specific sums to be paid by the member or stockholder
to the association upon the breach by him of any provision
of the marketing contract regarding the .ale or delitJery or
withholding of products; . . . and such clauses providing
for liquidated damages shall be enforceable as 'SUch and shall
not be regarded as penalties." (Emphasis added.) And the
first paragraph of section 1213 of said code states: "Any
provisions of law which are in conflict with this chapter shall
not be construed as applying to the associations herein provided for."
[1] The general rule in this state is that a contract which
undertakes to fix the amount of damages in anticipation of a
breach of an obligation is void to that extent (Cjv. Code,
§ 1670) except "when, from the nature of the ease, it would be
impracticable or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage."
(Civ. Code, § 1671.) Accordingly, it is beld that a party
relying on a liquidated damage clause in a contract must plead
and prove the facts validating his right to recover such predetermined amo1lllt. (Dyer Bro.. Golden Wesl Iron Works
v. Central Iron Works, 182 Cal. 588, 593 [189 P. 445] ; Robert
"tarsh ~ Co., Inc. v. Tremper, 210 Cal. 572, 576 [292 P. 950] ;
lUee v. Schmid, 18 Cal.2d 382, 385 [115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R.
589] ; Kekic'h, v. Blum, 43 Cal.App.2d 525, 527-528 [111 P.2d
411].)
However, an important exception to the general rule on the
remedy of liquidated damages prevails in the case of a nonprofit cooperative marketing association, as declared by section
1209 of the Agricultural Code above quoted. This exception
permits such an association and its members to stipulate in
advance the amount of damages to be paid upon the breach
of an obligation in the parti(,1l1ars of "the sale or delivery or
withholding of products" forming the object of their agree-
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ment. While such statutory language constitutes a grant of
power, that power is confined to the three sl1bj~cts specifically
mentioned flO that any undertaking on the part of the associa·
tion to go beyond those stated hmits must fall within the pro·
visions of sections 1670 and 1671 of the Civil Code, which, a<:!
heretofore noted, permit the recovery uf liquidat.ed damages
only where it would be m.praeticable or extremely difficult to
etItimate actual damages-:-a matter of pleading and proof
resting on t.he party seeking su<!h redress.
[2] Even in the absence of statut.e· it was welJ established
in this state that a nonprofit cooperative marketing associatio)J mjght <.'ontract for the payment by a member of R fltipU'
ltited sum tor the violation of his agreement 00 deliver all of
bis product to the association for processing and marketing.
(Anilheim Citrus Fruit AlSociation v. Yeoman, 51 Cal.App.
759, ,64 [197 P. 959]; Poult,.y p,.oduce,.s of Cent,.al Califo,..
nia, Inc. v. Murphy, 64 Cal.App. 450, 455 [221 P. 962] : California Canning Peach Growers v. Downey, 76 CaJ.App. 1,
11·12 [243 P. 679]; California Canning Peach Growers v.
Harri.'t. 91 Cal.App. 654, 655 [267 P. 572] : see, also, Poult,.y
Producers of Southern California, Inc. v. Ba,.low, 189 Cal.
278, 280·281 [208 P. 93] ; California Bean Growers' Association v. Rindge Land (fNa11igation Co., 199 Cal. 168, 183
[248 P. 658, 47 A.L.R. 904].) The validity of such a liquidated
damage provision stemmed from the principle that the whole
business scheme of the marketing association necessarily
depended upon its ability to hold and control the subject
matter of its operations, a consideration demonstrating the
disrupting effect which a member's failure to deliver all of
his product to the association would have on its successful
functioning and the consequent elements of damage which
would not be capable of any exact estimation. As was so aptly
stated with regard to such breach in delivery to the citrus
fruit cooperative involved in the Anaheim case, supra, at
pages 763-764: "The existence and life of the association itself
depended upon its being furnished fruit to dispose· of in the
public market. A reduction in the amount of fruit so handled
\vould not only tend to increase the overhead cost to the nontransgressing members, but, we may assume, to some extent
A lieet the prestige and standing of the association as a marketing concern; The argument would be the same, regardless of
the quantity of fruit which might have been delivered by the
defendant, whether it composed but a small fractional part
or one·half or more of the entire product designed to be mar-
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keted by the plaintiff agency [the association]. Enough has
been said, we think, to show that the case falls within the
class as to which the law permits damages to be liquidated by
contract in advance of their occurrence [Civ. Code, § 1671].
It follows as a necessary conclusion that plaintiff was entitled
to recover the exact amount fixed in its contract as the sum per
box which defendant should pay by reason of his failure to
market [his] fruit in the manner agreed." The same line of
reasoning was followed in Irwindale Citrus Assn. v. Semler,
60 Cal.App.2d 318, 323 [140 P.2d 716].
But all of these cases involved the quantity of the product
contracted for delivery to the marketing association and the
significance of a member's breach in that respect, 80 that a
part of his product was released for distribution through other
channels in competition with the cooperative enterprise and
to the detriment of all the members thereof. The quality of
the fruit delivered was not an issue and was not considered.
The same distinguishing observations apply with respeet to
delivery breaches discussed in similar cases from other jurisdictions. (See 25 A.L.R. 1113; supplement.ed in 33 A.L.R.
247; 47 A.L.R. 936; 77 A.L.R. 405; 98 A.L.R. 1406.) In the
instant case the quantity of the raisins delivered is not a point
of dispute, as it is admitted that the members delivered all of
their raisins to the Association for marketing. Rather here
it is the quality of the raisins that is at issue, so that the present problem transcends the scope of the decided cases. However, they are significant because of their discussion of the
economic considerations which tend to indicate the design of
the statntory law expressive of the legislative policy with
regard to the availability of liquidated damages in protecting
the integrity of a booperative marketing association.
[3] Pursuant to these preliminary remarks, there is to be
considered at the outset whether or not the grower membern
of the association who delivered wet raisins to the packing
house violated their marketing agreement in any of the particulars specified in section 1209 of the Agricultural Codethat is, in regard to "the sale or delivery or withholding of
products," as those terms are used in said section. Section 1
of the marketing agreement contemplates a sale of the raisins
by the grower to the Association when it provides that "the
Association buys and the Grower sells to the Association . . ."
his crop of raisins-a saJe with fut.ure delivery. This brings
into operation the provision of section 1208 of the Agricultnral
Code that if a contract of sale is made, "it shall be conclu-

Mar. 1949]

OLSON fl. BIOLA COOP. RAISIN
(33 C.2d 664; 204 P.2d 10]

GROWERS ASSN. 671

~t\d~' "dJ tt.:I} tif.lt~ 10 til" pnHhwts pa"S\'S ;~bsoiliteh , ... !
unreservedly, mwept for rpl~CJl'dctl lil'IIS, t.o the assoeiallllil
upon delivery." So here a sale of the raisins occurred and was
completed upon delivery to, and acceptance by, the association
and the pacl,er Scheidt. In contrast to such "sale" arrangement as here prevails, cooperative marketing agreements frequently provide for an agency relationship, under which the
grower agrees to deliver his crop to the association and
appoints the association his agent to handle and market the
crop for him and to return the net proceeds to him-a mere
"delivery" arrangement whereby title to the crop does not
pass to the association. But the equal importance of faithful
performance of either type of obligation is expressly recognized in section 1209 in the specific mention of "sale or delivery ... of products." The third reference in section 1209,
the" withholding of products," would appear to apply to any
act of the grower in holding back from the association any
part of the crop which he has either sold or is otherwise bound
to deliver to the association for marketing. As each grower
member admittedly turned over all his raisins to the association, and therefore made no default in performance with
respect to quantity, we are of the opinion, for the reasons
hereinafter stated, that a proper construction of the provisions of said section 1209 leads to the conclusion that plaintiffs
failed to show a breach of any of the three conditions enumerated as the premise for the recovery of liquidated damages.
[4] The above view of the qualifying language of section
1209 of the Agricultural Code follows the theory that the right
to delivery of its members' products is the most important
right of a cooperative marketing association, a matter that was
forcefully adjudicated in this state in the Anaheim and succeeding cases above cited, and which principle of judicial
decision presumably governed the Legislature's correlative
statutory action on the subject. (23 Cal.Jur. 783, § 159.) It was
the quantity, not the quality, feature of the members' delivery
that was considered the lifeblood of the cooperative and essential to the maintenance of its place in the competitive market.
That such was the Legislature's concept of the need for
liquidated damages as a protective measure for cooperatives
appears from other related sections of the Agricultural Code.
Thus section 1210 provides that "In the event of any suck
breach or threatened breach of such marketing contract by a
member, the association shall be entitled to an injunction to
prevent th(~ furt.her breach of the contract and to a decree of
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specific performance thereof. " (Emphasis added.) In so
making the remedies of injunction and specific performance
available to a cooperative marketing association on the same
basis as the remedy of liquidated damages-that is, for the
type of breach mentioned in section 1209, one "regarding
the sale or delivery or withholding of products"-the Legislature must have intended such judicial enforcement with
rl:'lation to the members' promised delivery in quantity rather
than to have the court undertake detailed supervisory measIIres to insure delivery not merely as to amount but likewise
as to the quality of the product, depending on the performance
of various farming operations which would yield the desired
standard. Likewise section 1211 provides that" In any action
upon· such marketing agreements. it shall be c(lnclusively pre·
sumed that a landowner or landlord or lessor is able to control
the delivery of products produced on his land by tenants or
others, . . .; and in such actions, the foregoing remedies for
Ilondelivery or breach shall lie and be enforceable against such
landowner, landlord or lessor." (Emphasis added.) In so
recognizing that a grower might attempt to evade his obli),ration as to delivery under the marketing agreement by leasing
his land to another, thus supposedly divesting himself of
control over the crop, and in rendering such device ineffectual, .
the Legislature again evinced its intent that the matter of
delivery within the landowner's control would be the quantity,
not the quahty dependent on various practices of husbandry
that might prevail on the farm. In other words, these provi·
sions all point to the f}lndamental tenet of exclusive dealing
between such association and its members, in the sense of full
delivery of the promised product, as the limit of legislative
concern, and not the added consideration of varian<.'e in the
condition of the product delivered with the involvement of
multiple details as to farming operations.
[6] While plaintiffs do not cite any section of the Agri.
cultural Code that specifically permits contracting for the
recovery of liquidated damages for breach of an agreement
as to the quality of the product to be delivered, they claim
that such would be within the scope of the reference in section
1209 to "any provision of the marketing contract regarding
the sale or delivery or withholding of products." In pursuance
of this position, plaintiffs argue that in section 1 of the
marketing agreement each grower contracted to deliver his
raisins "properly cured and in good condition," and that
this covenant was breached by the delivery of wet raisins;
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that in section 7 each grower agreed to pay the liquidated
damages if he failed to deliver his raisins "in accordance
with the terms of this agreement"; that this covenant W!HI
broken by the delivery of wet raisins which were neither
., properly cured" nor ,. in good condition"; that therE.'upon
the agreement to pay liquidated damages came into E.'tYect
and could be enforced within the intent of the "omnibus
provisions" of section 1209. They also argue that under the
quoted language of section 1213 of the Agricultural Code,
the provisions of section 1670 and 1671 of the Civil Code
have no application in this case. But to construE.' section
1209 as an "omnibus" provision would in effect eliminate
any premise of limitation consistent with the three particulars
mentioned as the basis for the contracting for liquidated
damages and would allow ~lUch remedy for the breach of
"any provision of thE.' marketing contract," without qualification. However, the statute does qualify the availability of
the remedy and, as above construed. it refers to "delivery"
as embracing an agency relationship in contrast to a "sale,"
as here prevails. Accordingly, the word "delivery" cannot
be said to connote there, as plaintiffs contend, "time, place,
manner, object, quantity and quality"-an •'omnibus " concept which would far exceed the idea of the fact of delivery
of the promised amount as a measure of assurance to the
cooperative marketing association that its whole scheme of
organization would not be nullified by some of the product
of its members reaching the public market through outside
competitive channels, to its disadvantage and. perhaps, to
its ultimate break-up. Since upon the record plaintiffs' claim
involves the qu~lity, not the quantity, of raisins delivered,
the provisions of sections 1670 and 1671 are not in conflict
with the provisions of the Agricultural Code insofar as the
facts of this case are concerned, and section 1213 of the latter
code does not aid their position.
[6] Moreover, a study of the entire marketing agreement
leads to the conclusion that it was the intention of the contracting parties to provide for the recovery of liquidated
damages only when a grower member failed or refused to
deliver all his raisins to the Association. Such overall examination accords with the fundamental rule that the determination of the meaning of a contract depends. in each case,
upon thE' intent of the parties as evidenced by the entire
agreement construed in the light of the circumstances under
III r:.2<1-22
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wus 1II:t1It-'.(Ch·. Code, §§ 16:lli, Hi41; Ogb·una v.
j'ravelet·s In.'f,,.nmce 00., j()7 Cal. ,jll. ~j l:ri6 P. IOU41.) In
other words, the" 'sense and lIl('aning of the parties to any
'.dUd! it

particular instrument should be collected ex antecedental'us
et consequentibtts; that is to say, every part of it should be
brought into action, in order to collect from the whole one
uniform and consistent sense, if that may be done.''' (Balfout' v. Fresno Canal ct Irrigation Co., 109 Cal. 221, 227
141 P. 8761.)
So pertinent are these considerations of language in the
parties' marketing agreement. Section 13 appears to be a
slIJDmary of the prior provision on the subject of liquidated
damages. It conditions the agreement to pay such sum upon
the fact of failure to deliver. Likewise section 7, containing
the agreed terms- for the liquidated damages, suggests that
it was intended to apply upon failure to deliver the full
amount of the product, and not upon failure in the quality
of the product. In addition to other provisions, the section
('x pressly states that it would be "impracticable and extremely
difficult to determine and fix" the damages "in the event
t hat Grower should fail to deliver raisins hereby sold in
accordance with the terms of this agreement," and accordingly, the damage liability is related directly to the circumstance of default in the promised tonnage of raisins. It' has
been held that such declaration is a true statement of a fact
in the case of the failure to deliver to a cooperative marketing
association, as the subject has been exhaustively discussed in
the above-noted decisions in this and other jurisdictions. But
the same result does not I?revail in the case-of the delivery ''Of
substandard raisins for the reason that raisins are graded, and
each 'grade has an ascertainable market value which may vary
from season to season and from time to time. Raisins not
properly cured, of course, have a less market value than
those properly cured. The loss from a violation of the contract specification as to quality may be ascertained and deter~
mined under the ordinary rules of the law of damages. (Rice
v. Schmid, supra, 18 Cal.2d 382, 385-386.) That the parties
had such principle in mind for the assessment of damages in
the event of delivery of a substandard lot of raisins appears
from their failure to provide in their agreement a variable
pecuniary standard, according to the degree of default, for
the computation of liquidated damages rather than a fiat
rate which might be far in excess of the actual damages sustained where the default in quality was slight, and the re-
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sultant damage obligation would partake of the nature of a
pena tty, contrary to "the effort of the law" to "work [an 1
equitable result" in casting "upon the delinquent party a
liability to respond to" a reasonable asspssment of damages.
(Anaheim Citrus Fruit Association v. Yeoman, supra, 51
Cal.App. 759, 761; Mente & Co., Inc. v. Fresno Compresli
& Warehouse Co., 113 Cal.App. 325, 330-331 [298 P. 126].)
Likewise the flat rate of liquidated damages provided in tht'
marketing agreement might be wholly inadequate if the fruit
deli vcred was greatly below the promised standard or the
nature of the defect was such that the substandard lot might
contaminate the other lots of raisins of the association with
which it was mixed, and so cause a very substantial loss, which
the parties could not have reasonably anticipated in predt'termining the damage liability as a "fair compensation for
the loss sustained." (Rice v. Schmid, supra, 18 Ca1.2d 382,
386.)
In the light of the foregoing discussion, plaintiffs' position
on this appeal cannot be sustained. The provisions of the
Agricultural Code do not authorize a contract for the recovery of liquidated damages because of the inferior quality
of the product delivered to and accepted by a nonprofit
cooperative marketing association; and an analysis of the
particular marketing agreement here in question aoes not
!'.how such damage liability to have been within the contemplation of the parties.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J .. and Edmonds, J., concurred.
CARTER, J .-1 dissent. I disagree with the position taken
by the majority in this caSe. That position is not only not
in accord with the various statutory provisions involved. but
in effect holds that this court will not enforce the terms of
a contract, which is not illegal or in contravention of public
policy, and which was made by parties capable of contracting.
It seems quite apparent to me that the result reached in
the majority opinion is achieved by ignoring the facts in\'olved and concentrating on the unexpressed thought that
to do otherwise would be to come to a harsh result. It also
seems quite apparent to me that if I contract to buy a horse
wil h four sound legs and I am ~old ont' with only three legs
I should be able to pnforce my contract. However, I may
be assuming too much-as the three-legged horse might be
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able to walk, and the majority of this court would therefore .
hold that I got all that I bargained for.
Biola Cooperative Raisin Growers Association .was organized as a nonprofit cooperative marketing association under
the laws of the State of California. Plaintiffs, four members
of the Association, brought this action, a representative suit,
against the association and the other 16 members thereof,
including the five directors, to recover liquidated damagps
alleged to be due by virtue of the delivery of raisins of substandard quality under the provisions of the marketing agreement between the Association and its various members. Eight
of the individually named defendants were found to be so
liable in conformity with the theory of plaintiffs' complaint,
and judgment was accordingly entered against them in varying amounts computed on the basis of their tonnage delivery
of raisins of defective quality. The total sum amounted to
$19,856.79 plus interest and costs. These defendants have
appealed, eontending that liquidated damages were not properly assessed against them for several reasons hereinafter
stated.
On October 20, 1944, plaintiff Chris H. Scheidt, a grower
member of the association, entered into an agreement with
the sssociation whereby he undertook to process and pack
the raisin crop of the association for the year 1944 for a
specified sum per ton. He rented the association's packing
house for the season, and the association's members agreed,
in writing, to deliver their raisins there "properly cured and
in good condition." The contract provided further that he
would "perform said packing operations according to the
instructions of the Association and the specifications provided
by the government in packing same." The pertinent provisions of the marketing agreement entered into by all grower
members in 1941 with the association are as follows:
"Section 1: The Association buys and the Grower sells to
the Association annually from the date of the signing of the
By-Laws of the Association and this agreement all of the
raisins owned and grown by the Grower, and agrees to deliver the same and all thereof properly cured and in {JoQ(l
condition to the plant of the Association. . . ."
"Section 5: The Association reserves the power to set
standards of maturity, quality, sugar, and moisture ('on tent,
whieh must be met by all raisins delivered by the Grower...•
"Section 7: In the event that Grower should fail to tfeliver raisins hereby sold in accordance with the terms of this

)

Mar. 1949]

OLSON

v.

nTOt,A

COOf'.

RAT~[N GROWERS

ASSN. 677

[33 C.2d 66(; 204 P.2d 101

agreement and these By-Laws, such act will injure the Association to an amonnt that is, and will be impracticable and
extremely difficult to determine and fix, and that is, therefore,
thed at the amount of Twenty-Five (25%) percent of the
average current seasonal price for each and every ton of
raisins that the Grower fai18 to deliver in accordance with
the terms hereof and· these By-Laws, and which amount the
Grower agrees to pay, and shall pay, to the Association upon
demand, ...
"Section 13: It is expressly understood and agreed that
Grower hRS by this agreement agreed to and will deliver the
raisins herein contracted to be delivered to .the Association,
or in lieu thereof to pay liquidated damages therefor as by
this agreement provided for his failure so to do, . . .
"Section 14: It is further understood and agreed that
should any controversy arise between the Association and the
Grower pertaining to the quality or quantity of any raisiJllll
dnlivered, or to be delivered hereunder, and an agreement
cannot be reached blftween the parties, that the same shall be
referred to a board I)f arbitration consisting of three parties,
one designated by the Board of Directors of the Association,
one by the Grower, and one by the two so designated, and
their decision in regard thereto shall be final and binding
upon both parties hereto." (Emphasis added.)
Shortly after t.he packing agreement with Chris B. Scheidt
had been ent&ed into, the growers began delivery to him
under the terms of their agreements with the association.
The deliveries were concluded early in 1945. Although the
association had reserved the power to set standards of maturity, quality, sugar, and moisture content it had not done
so. However, it appears that 55 per cent of the raisin crop
in question was under contract for sale to the United States
government, and the federal regulations, introduced in evidence, permitted Ii moisture content of Unot more than 18
per cent."
In accordance with the marketing agreement, and upon
the basis of the standard set by the government, arbitration
proceedings were had on November 26, 1945, between the
members of the association, with the exception of defendant
J. H. Scheidt. The court ordered J. H. Scheidt to appoint
an arbitrator within 30 days so that the arbitration with
respect to the quality of his raisins could be disposed of, but
Scheidt declined to do so, and consented to the court passing
UpOA and determ.ining t!le quality of raisins delivered by him
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.. f !'.I. :/ ..",,,·;,,1 iOIl. alll.l at thl' f l'ial iutrmluced evidellce U}JUlC
tltitt j~ul'. Till' COIll·t coufirmeu the report of the arbitrators

and found that, in accordance therewith, certain of the individnal defendants, including J. H. Scheidt, had delivered
raisins with excessive moisture content and the amount
thereof.
There is substantial evidence, as will be shown in some
detail later in this opinion. that Rome portions of the raisins
delivered by the eight grower members of the association
against whom judgment was rendered were so high in moisture
content that they could not be run through the stemmer and
processed without further drying. Finding that such raisins
"were not properly dried and cured but were too wet and
contained too much moisture and were too heavy for processing and marketing" the trial court determined the exact
weight of the defective delivery made by each of the defaulting
growers and accordingly proportioned against them plaintiffs'
recovery of liquidated damages.
Defendants contend that plaintiffs could not recover liquidated damages without alleging and proving that aetnal
damages would be "impractieable or extremely difficult to
fix .. _" in accordance with the provisions of section 1670
of the Civil Code. That this is the general rule in this state
where there is a contract which undertakes to :fix the amount
of damages in anticipation of an obligation has been so held
in the following cases: Rice v. Schmid, 18 Cal.2d 382, 385
[115 P.2d 498, 138 A.L.R. 5891; Robert Marsh <f Co., Inc. v.
Tremper, 210 Cal. 572, 576 {292 P. 9501: Dyer Bros Etc.
1. Wk •. v. Central Iron W1ts, 182 Cal. 588 [189 P. 445];
Kekick v. Bl·um,43 Cal.App.2d 525 [111 P.2d 411]. But the
Legislature has provided for an exception to this rule with
respect to liquidated damages where 8 nonprofit eooperative
marketing association is concerned. This exception, which
is a grant of power to such cooperatives. is set forth in section
1209 of the Agricultural Code: "The by-laws or the marketing contract may fix, as liquidated damages. specific sums to
be paid by t.he memher or stockbo1c1er to the aRSociation upon
the breach by him of any provision of the marketing eontrllct
regarding the sale or delivery or withholding of products;
... and any such· provisions shall be valid and enforceable
in the courts of this State: and slwh "JallSE'lI providing for
liqnidated damages slullI be enforceable 88 such and shall not
be regarded as penalties."
.
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The majority say that the alleged breach by defendants
not fall within the above section of the Agricultural Code
in that the intention of the Legislature was to provide for:"
nt'liveries deficient in quantity, rather than deliveries of
produce of defective quality.
In order to conclude that this contention has merit it is '
necessary to iv.nore cortain terms of the marketing agreement
entered into by each defendant with the a.'ISOciation. It was
there ~urreed that each ~rower Mould sell "all of the raisins
owned and grown" by him, and that the grower "agrees to
deliver the same and aU tk,weof properly et£red and in Good
conditio·n." [Emphasis add~d.]
Section 1208 of the Agricllltural Code provides iu pnrt
that "If they contract a sale w the association, it shall be
conclusively held that title to the products passes absolutely
alul ulIre1iprvedly, e:-tcept for recorded liens, to tke association
ulJOn delivery: or nt any othE'r specified time if expressly and
definitely agreed in the said contract." (Emphasis added.) .
Section 1725(3) of the Civil Code provides that: "Where
the parties purport to effect a present sale of future goods,
the agreement operates as a contract to sell the goods and as
soon as the !:elJer acquires the goods the property therein
shall pass to the buyer without further act if the parties so
intend unless the agreement otherwi.~e provides."
Section 1213 of the Agricultural Code provides that: " Any
provisions of law \vhich are in confiict with this chapter shall
not be construed as applying to the associations herein provided for."
Construing thelie statutory provisions together with the
marketing tlboreemcnt, which made no provision for the time
title was to pass, if ",uofdd aPl'ear that Ike sale of the raisins
WIl$ to take place ttpon delivery of tke raisins to tke Association in accordance with· tke terms of tke contract, thus bring.
ing the present ease ,vithin the provisions of sectioIJ.. 1209 of
the Agricultural Code. That section provides that liquidated
damages mny be provided for upon the breach by a member
"of any provision of the marketing contract regarding the
sale . . . of products. . . ."
Why the majority feel it necessary to discuss the practice
of delivery of produce by the growcr to a cooperative nssoeiation as agent for the sale of' that produce is not clear. That
practice is not involved here. It is also not clear just why the
facts of this case do not bring it within the provisions of the
Agricultural Code (§1209). The parties contracted for the
rlO(,8
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sale of fruit in a certain condition. Further, aU applicable
laws in existence at the time the contract is made become a
part thereof as fully as if incorporated by reference. (Civ.
Code, § 1656; 6 Cal.Jur. 311, § 186; Calpetro P. Syndicate v.
C. M. WootU Co., 206 Cal. 246 [274 P. 651). The partIes
then· intended, because it is so provided in the Agricultural
Code, that title should pass when the fruit was delivered.
This is the time the sale took place, not when the contract to
sell was entered into. The contract was breached with respect
to the quality of. the fruit which was to be delivered. AI I
have previously pointed out, the Legislature has specifically
provided that the parties. may contract for liquidated damages
to be paid to the association upon any breach by a member
regarding the sale of products. The parties did so contract
and the breach occurred, but the majority of this court refuse
to allow that contract to be enforced. I cannot agree with a
result which ignores not only the intent of the parties as
expressed in their contract, but which also ignores the clear
provisions of the Agricultural Code.
In the absence of statute in this state, it was well established
that a nonprofit cooperative marketing association might contract for the payment by a member of liquidated damages
for the violation of his agreement to deliver his product- to
the association for processing and marketing. (Oalifornia
etc. Ass'n. v. Rindge L. ff N. 00., 199 Cal. 168 [248 P. 658,47
A.L.R. 904] ; Poultry Producer, 0/ 80. Oal. v. Barlow, 189
Cal. 278 [208 P. 93] ; Anaheim C. P. AI,'n. v. Yeoman, 51
Cal.App. 759 [197 P. 959].) The validity of liquidated
damage provisions in situations involving cooperatives was
established because of the need on the part of these associa--tionstooontrol thequantio/ of the particular commodity
involved. AI was said in the Anaheim case, decided before
the enactment of the present code sections: •• The existence
and life of the association itself depended· upon its being
furnished fruit to dispose of in the public market. A reduction in the amount of fruit so handled would not only tend
to increase the overhead cost to the non transgressing members,
but, we may assume, to some extent dect the prestige and
standing of the association as a marketing concern." (51
Cal.App. 759, 763.) These words are equally applicable to a
situation such as the one here uuder consideration. The
quality of the produce to be marketed may be of vital importance to the prest.ige of the association, and one does not
need a vivid imagination to anticipate such situationa. In the
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present case, the associat.iQn And itR melllbl'fS had agreed be·
tween themselves +.hat fruit of a ccrtain quality should be
delivered. The association had contracted with the government:of the United States that fruit of 8 certain moisture
contellt. should be packed and delivered. As a result of the
derelictions of certain members, the association was unable
to meet its government contracts and the raisins in question
were sold, unprocessed, to others. That the association and
the members considered the quality of the raisins important
is evident from the termS of the marketing agreement. It is
equally evident that the prestige and standing of a marketing
association may suffer as well from not being able to meet
its contracts because of the poor quality of the produce as
from a deficiency in quantity. If" to be Mted Aere tAat the
poor qualit71 of tAe raisifU prevented tAem from being packed
and tAUI tAe result was precisely tAe same as if tAe de/av.lting
growers Aad not delive,.ed all tAe raisins produced b71 tAem.
That the unprocessed raisins were subsequently sold to others
is immaterial with respect to the standing and prestige of
the association. The fact remains that it, admittedly, could
not meet its contracts with the government for processed
raisins. It is thus apparent that the association was injured
by the breach of the marketing contract.
The defendants next contend that the words "properly
cured and in good condition" were ambiguous; and that although the raisins in question were delivered during the latter
months of the year 1944, the chemical tests, showing the
exces$ve water content of the raisins, were not made until
January, 1945. Oral evidence is, ad:aililsible to show the meaning of a term in a particular trade or business in order to
enable the court to interpret the writing. This oral evidence
is not received to vary or contradict the writing but to explain it. (ErmoZieff v. R~ K. O. Radio Pictur", 19 Cal.2d
543 [122 P.2d 3]; Oalifornia C. P. Growe,., v. Williams, 11
Cal.2d 221 [78 P.2d 1154]; Body-Steffne,. 00. v. Flotill
Produof., 63 Cal.App.2d 555 [147 P.2d 84].) In the Ermolieff
case this court said (p. 550): "The basis of this rule is that
to accomplish a purpose of paramount importance in interpretation of documents, namely, to ascertain the true intent
of the parties, it may well be said that the usage evidence
:loes not alter the contract of the parties, but on the contrary
rives the effect to the words there used as intended by the
)arties. The usagf' becomes a part of the contract in aid of
ts correct interpretation." It iii apparent from the record
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all t hI' gro,,,ers han bc('n in the hURincss for many years,

and wpre well aware of thc f}ld 1hilt raisins properly cured

and in good condition were raisins that would go through
the' 'stemmer," a machine used preparatory to packing the
fruit. That these raisins would uot go through the "stemmer"
and were necessarily stacked inside and out of the packing
house is, in itself, evidence that the raisins were not de·
livered in accordance with the agreement. With reRpect to
the raisins delivered by defendant J. H. Scheidt, there was
testimony to the effeCt that he had admitted that his raisins
were too "wet" and that he had got "more [money] than
was coming to me" for them. Section 1870(2) of the Code of
Civil Procedure provides that: "The act, declaration, or
omission of a party" is evidence against such party. "The
rule is settled beyond all controversy that the admissions or
declarations of a party to a suit are admissible as evidence
against the party making them. When given in evidence,
they tend, as does other competent evidence, to prove the fact
in issue to which they relate." (Hall v. Bark "Em~1y Banning," 33 Cal. 522, 524.) (Gates v. Pendleton, 71 Cal.App.
752 [236 P. 365]; Langensand v. Obert, 129 Ca1.App. 214
[18 P.2d 725].)
The contention is made that the trial court restricted the
defendants' right of cross-examination of one of plaintiffs'
witnesses, and refused the admission of other evidence. The
evidence sought to be introduced in the cross-examination
was with respect to the custom of packing houses, other
than the one here under consideration, of stacking the boxes
of raisins until they were sufficiently dried out to run through
the "stemmer." The objection was made and sustained that
this custom was immaterial I to the issue involved-whether
these particular raisins were delivered in conformity with
the provisions of the marketing agreement. The excluded
evidence consisted of a reiteration of testimony given before
the arbitrators as to the condition of the raisins of one of
the other growers. The trial court ruled that this had been
concluded by the report of the arbitrators. But conceding,
witbout deciding that this was not a proper ground for such
ruling, it seems clear that the custom of other packing houses
could not have been material to the present case since the
issue at hand was whether or not the defendants had breached
their agreement with the association. While facts concerning
conditions at places other than those concerned in the case
on trial may be admissible in evidence as bearing upon the
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issues of a case, in order to render such evidence admis&ible
it must be shown that such conditions are substantially the
same as that concerned in the instant case. There was no
showing here nor offer to show that the other packing houses
were similar with respect to lack of drying facilities, or that
the marketing agreements were the same.
The defendants maintain that even if the raisins were not
delivered in conformity with the contract they were accepted
by the association, and that as a result the provision with
respect to the quality of the raisins was waived. The record shows that as the defective raisins were brought in
by the growers, Chris H. Scheidt complained that they were
too wet to pack, and reported their condition to the secretary.
manager, and the president of the association who, in tarn,
reported to the board of directors. Chris H. Scheidt had DO
authority to do more than report the derelictions to the
directors. He was under no obligation to reject the raisins
delivered by the members. Under his contract with thE' association he was bound only to pack the raisins as they were
delivered to him by the growers. His acceptance of the ctefective raisins could not have bound the association. Ilnrl
cannot be considered a waiver on its part to the terms of the
marketing agreement.
Three of the five directors of the association were among
those members who delivered the defective raisins to the
association. When notice was given of the defective quality of
the raisins and of the resultant breach of the marketing agreement, it became their duty to enforce the terms of the contract.
By not doing so, they obtained an advantage for themselves
and the other defaulting members of the association. Directors
of a cooperative hold the property and property rights of the
members thereof as trustees. (BogardU8 v. Santa AM W. G.
Ass'n., 41 Cal.App.2d 939 [108 P.2d 52] ; San Joaquin V. P.
Producers' Ass '11.. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 136 F.2d
382, 385; Texas Certified Cottonseed Breeders' Ass '11.. v. Aldridge, 122 Tex. 464 [61 S.W.2d 79] ; Bowles v. Inland Empire
Da1'ry Ass'n., 53 F.Supp. 210, 214, 215.) The directors, knowing of their own defective deliveries, and the deliveries of
the other defaulting members were bound to compel compliance
with the marketing agreements and to pay damages themselves
and to enforce the liquidated damage provisions of the agreement. Further, by the terms of the by-laws they were required
to withhold payments to any member indebted to the association, SO that the lien of the association on monies due it by
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a member would be safeguarded. In not so doing, they \ver£'
guilty of a breach of trust with respect to the association and
the other members. As such trustees, they were bound to act
with t he utmost good faith. (Churchill v. Peters, 57 Cal.App.
2d 321 (134 P.2d 841] ; Estate of Brown. 22 Cal.App.2d 480
[71 P.2d 345] ; Overell v. Overell, 78 Cal.App. 251 [248 P.
310].)
The trial court correctly found that it was not necessary
that plaintiffs make a demand on the directors that the term~
of the marketing' agreement be enforced because such demand
would have been futile as three of the five directors werc
among the defaulting members. The law does not require the
doing of a futile act. (Smith v. Dorn, 96 Cal. 73 [30 P. 1024] ;
Koshaba v. Koshaba, 56 Cal.App.2d 302 [132 P.2d 854] ; 6A
Cal.Jur. 810-812, and cases there cited.) In Smith v. Dm'n.
supra, page 79, the court said; "Besides, the answer of the
corporation shows that any demand upon it or upon its
controlling directors for the remedy sought by this action, or
any remedy for the wrongs alleged, would have been useless.
Therefore, no such demand was necessary." (Ashton v. Dashaway Association, 84 Cal. 61 [22 P. 660,23 P. 1091, 7 L.R.A.
809] ; Moyle v. Lander's Adm'rs., 83 Cal. 579 [23 P. 798] ;
Parrott v. Byers, 40 Cal. 614.)
The point is made by the defendants that one of the
plaintiffs, Chris H. Seheidt, does not come into equity with
"clean hands" in that he refused to let the defaulting growers retake their raisins for further drying, and that it was his
duty to do so in order to mitigate damages. An examination
of the record shows that the evidence was conflicting as to
whether the growers tried to retake the raisins for further
drying, and with respect to whether they intended to return
them to Chris H. Scheidt for packing thereafter. It was the
province of the trial court to resolve this conflict, and it is to
be presumed that the trial judge reconciled and accounted for,
to his own satisfaction, any and all inconsistencies which
might be made to appear in the testimony.
There is no merit in defendants' contention that the judgment for attorneys' fees and the appointment of a receiver
was erroneous. "It is a well-established doctrine of equity
jurisprudence that where a common fund exists to which a
number of persons are entitled and in their interest successful
litigation is maintained for its preservation and protection,
an allowance of counsel fees may properly be made from such
fund. By this means all of the beneficiaries of the fund pay
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their share of the expl'll~ ncet'ssary to IIlllkf' it llyailabl.· to
them." (Emphasi~ added.) (Willslow v. Harold G. Fergu·
son Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 274, 27'[ 1153 P.2d 714j.) And a court of
equity has inht'rent power to appoint a receiver at the request
of stockholders on grounds of fraud or mismanagement.
(Koshaba v. Koshaba, supra.)
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the judgment.
TRAYNOR, J., and SCHAUER, J.-We concur in the
conclusion reached by Justice Carter and generally in the
grounds stated therefor.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied April21.
1949. Carter, J., Traynor, J!, and Schauer, J., voted for a
rehearing.

